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The Biometric Imaginary: 
Standardization & Objectivity in Post-






Starting in March 2012, the South African government engaged in a massive 
effort of citizen registration that continued for more than a year. Nearly 19 
million social welfare beneficiaries enrolled in a novel biometric identification 
scheme that uses fingerprints and voice recognition to authenticate social grant 
recipients. This paper seeks to understand the meaning of biometric technology 
in post-apartheid South African welfare through a study of the bureaucratic and 
policy elite’s motivation for this undertaking. It suggests that biometric 
technology was conceived of and implemented as the most recent in a series of 
institutional, infrastructural, and policy reforms that seek to deliver welfare in a 
standardized and objective manner. This technopolitical imaginary has 




1. Introduction: The Biometric Imaginary in 
Post-Apartheid Welfare 
 
Beginning in March 2012 and continuing for about a year and a half, 18.9 
million predominantly low-income South African residents queued at 
government facilities to be photographed and submit their personal details, 
including a full set of fingerprints and a voice recording (SASSA, 2013b). From 
rural towns to major cities, old and young alike were required to present 
themselves for this massive registration drive. States make records of their 
citizens for various reasons, and depending on the age of those queued, chances 
were they had been similarly registered in the past, perhaps for racial labor 
control during apartheid, perhaps for South Africa’s democratic election in 
1994.  
 
The episode in question, though, was the result of a bureaucratic decision by 
welfare policymakers to implement a new administrative infrastructure for 
South Africa’s extensive program of social grants. These programs have deep 
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roots, with formal welfare beginning in the 1920s as an effort to curtail poverty 
within the white population (Seekings, 2007). In subsequent decades, it 
expanded considerably. Today the grants are designated primarily for the 
elderly, poor caregivers, and the disabled, and these monthly government-to-





Despite this, as Everatt (2008: 301) notes, the politics of welfare in South Africa 
are contentious. Broadly, it is divided between proponents (usually represented 
by “COSATU and the SACP, the churches, and some elements of civil society”) 
and opponents (“including senior government officials, business, and much of 
the media”). While proponents tends to be motivated by apartheid’s legacy of 
poverty and inequality and draw on the protections of the Constitution, there is 
also a strand of support that promotes grants as a means to escape a poverty trap, 
allowing the poor to enter the market as entrepreneurial risk-takers (Ferguson, 
2010).
2
 In contrast, opponents tend to worry about the cost of the grants, the risk 
of welfare dependency, and perverse incentives; they more often point to 
something called ‘the dignity of work’ as the appropriate path out of poverty 
(see Meth, 2004; Barchiesi, 2011). 
 
Those 19 million residents – nearly 40 percent of the country’s entire population 
– provided their personal details in order to receive their grants through a new 
payment system (SASSA, 2013b). For the government, the system promised a 
reliable means of delivering millions of rand per month. As the Minister of 
Social Development Bathabile Dlamini (2013) would explain, the goal was “to 
improve the integrity of our social security system, and to eliminate all forms of 
fraud and corruption.” Prominent civil society organizations like the Black Sash, 
too, “welcomed [the] move to a biometric system” (Nyembezi, 2012). For the 
recipients, the new system aimed to offer increased convenience through the 
provision of a payment card accepted at a large cash distribution network 
established by the government’s contractor, Net1 CPS. 
 
The cornerstone of this new system is biometric identification, the use of 
technologies to recognize specific bodily features. A fingerprint would also be 
the primary means of authenticating recipients, but in case a fingerprint scanner 
was unavailable, the grant recipients also provided a voice recording, to serve as 
a back-up means of verifying individuals at the time of payment. This is not the 
first time biometric identification has been used widely in South Africa. Both 
                                           
1
 On the grants as a type of ‘redistributive economy,’ see Bähre’s (2011) informative 
discussion. 
2
 In the case of COSATU, whose members stand to gain through the defense of high wages, a 
relaxed need to support poor dependents, and an expansion of state administration, there is 
also a measure of self-interest (Seekings & Matisonn, 2003) 
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before and during apartheid, government officials were enamored of the 
potential for using analog fingerprinting to identify individuals, most commonly 
in schemes of racial labor control. In the post-apartheid era, digital biometric 
technology has been central to the identification programs of the Department of 
Home Affairs, as well as used extensively in previous welfare systems.  
 
Yet rarely have these systems functioned as promised, whether for good or ill. 
Without ignoring the very real human cost of authoritarianism, Evans (1997: 99) 
suggests that “the collective impact of recent scholarship on the labor bureau 
system has steadily destroyed the structure’s reputation for omnipotence and 
doctrinaire imperiousness.” Breckenridge (2005a) suggests the biometric 
obsession even undermined the apartheid state’s ability to act. In the post-
apartheid era, too, despite significant investment, large-scale biometric 
identification schemes have stalled or proven ineffective (Breckenridge, 2008). 
Therefore, the continuing salience of biometric identification amongst the 
bureaucratic and policy elite seems curious. To explain this ‘non-scandal,’ this 
paper narrates the post-apartheid history of welfare state building that 
culminated in the 2012-2013 biometric registration drive. To do so, I rely 
primarily on government documents, civil society reports, court filings, 
parliamentary minutes, and nearly a dozen interviews with stakeholders. I pay 
particular attention to the ways in which elites conceptualize and attach meaning 
to biometric identification and the reasons for which it is adopted by 
policymakers and members of government, especially those within the welfare 
administration.  
*** 
Historians have suggested that states and societies tend to cohere particular 
systems for registering and identifying individuals. “Viewed globally,” write 
Szreter and Breckenridge (2012: 3), “societies, and the individuals within them, 
seem to be very variably shaped by what we might call cultures of registration”. 
Similarly, Caplan (2001: 51) suggests that a “culture of identification” – 
“essentially unruly” but comparatively distinct – can be said to exist in a given 
society. These cultures are the historically contingent results of evolving 
politics, economics, technology, and more.  
 
In this paper I aim to explicate some of the dynamics behind a post-apartheid 
culture of registration and identification. I argue that a relatively stable and 
collective understanding exists among the bureaucratic and policy elite about 
how to constitute the relationship between the welfare state and beneficiary. In 
brief, this collective understanding – that I propose to call the biometric 
imaginary – posits biometric technology as a necessary, suitable, and effective 
means of constructing a standardized and objective welfare state. This paper 




The will to standardize has arisen as a means of uniting and improving the 
fragmented and weak bureaucracy inherited from the apartheid regime. South 
Africa has endeavored to create equality of citizenship through imposing 
uniformity. This has included bureaucratic centralization (first through the 
establishment of a unitary, national Department of Social Development (DSD) 
in 1994, and after through the creation of the South African Social Security 
Agency (SASSA) in 2005) as well as technological reform (such as through the 
linking of various databases and implementation of new payment 
infrastructures). 
 
In parallel, an egalitarian ethos has militated against subjectivity, in favor of 
rule-bound practices. As De Tocqueville and Weber elaborated long ago, in a 
democratic setting, subjective discretion is viewed with suspicion. In post-
apartheid social protection, two forms of discretion have proven particularly 
troubling: illicit access to grants and bureaucratic error. A preference for 
objective practice has deeply influenced the social grants, with biometric 
identification offering an impersonal and presumptively neutral means of grant 
administration. 
 
Both standardization and objectivity are widespread and productive—though not 
hegemonic—commitments that shape the understanding of biometric 
registration and identification. This particular confluence of the will to 
standardize, the pursuit of objectivity, and the use of social grants has given rise 
to the belief that biometric identification is necessary, suitable, and effective. As 
in Appadurai’s (1996: 31) discussions of social imaginaries, the biometric 
imaginary is “a constructed landscape of collective aspirations” that serves as a 
“staging ground for action”. These imaginaries are productive social forces with 
real-world implications, but they do not always accurately correspond to reality, 
exhibiting varying degrees of interpretive flexibility. As I will contend, the 
dominant understanding of biometrics as necessary, suitable, and effective are 
each, in part, fantasy and reality. 
 
However, the biometric imaginary is not merely relevant at the level of ideas; it 
has material effects. Biometric welfare is a form of technopolitics, Hecht’s 
(2009 [1998]: 15) term for the “strategic practice of designing or using 
technology to constitute, embody, or enact political goals.” The discussion that 
follows will show how the will to standardize and the pursuit of objectivity have 
driven a series of technopolitical programs within the post-apartheid welfare 
sector, including institutional centralization, technological standardization, and 
bureaucratic automation.  
 
Although biometric technology has been used in grant delivery for at least two 
decades, the 2012 SASSA contract with Net1 CPS is an unprecedented moment: 
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a nationally centralized database of 19 million grant beneficiaries who are 
biometrically identified for each payment. It may be too soon to tell if the new 
biometric registration and payment system will prove to be another troubled use 
of the technology by the South African state; however the emulation of both 
South Africa’s system of social grants (Hanlon et al., 2010) and biometric 
methodologies (Gelb and Clark, 2011; Breckenridge, 2010) suggests the need 
for an understanding of the conceptualization, meaning, and drivers of biometric 
welfare in South Africa. This paper next turns to the drivers of standardization 
and objectivity before showing how—and with what consequences—biometrics 
have been used to reach those goals. 
 
 
2. The Will to Standardize 
 
As apartheid ended in the early 1990s, an insidious danger lurked in the 
governing structure of post-apartheid South Africa. To a significant degree, the 
quasi-independent homelands lacked competent bureaucracies and were riddled 
with corruption. Furthermore, the provinces displayed a high degree of 
variability in their processes, technologies, and adeptness. For example, despite 
the panoptic ambitions of the apartheid government, the basic task of population 
registration was split between more than “a dozen discrete yet overlapping and 
duplicated population registers” (Breckenridge, 2005b: 276). The story was 
similar within welfare due to a 1984 designation in the tricameral parliament of 
the sector as an “own affair”. The peculiar result was “the creation of costly and 
duplicated administrative structures, with 13 ‘national’ and 4 provincial head 
offices, plus another 3 coordinating departments” (Lund, 2008: 10-11).  
 
As the government began in earnest to address the situation, it convened a series 
of national commissions of inquiry. Beginning in 1992, no less than five more 
major national commissions were convened. These commissions reflected the 
solidifying politics of post-apartheid welfare, concerned primarily with 
improving the delivery of social protection while reducing fraud and corruption 
in the system. Although alternatives (such as significant delegation to the 
provinces) were at least considered, these initiatives rather quickly coalesced 
around an understanding of the problem as fragmentation that impeded service 
delivery and created the opportunity for mischief. Increased uniformity required 
a process of standardization that, with time, was enacted through the 
administrative centralization of social protection. As we shall see, the issue of 
identifying the recipients was at the forefront of these processes. 
 
An early and influential source of this will to standardize was the 1996 
Committee for Restructuring of Social Security, led by Thabo Mbeki’s advisor 
Frank Chikane. The Chikane Committee was motivated by the belief that “the 
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delivery of social security is in crisis” (CRSS, 1996: 5). Fragmentation into 
fourteen separate systems, each with particular management, rules, and 
procedures, created the opportunity for loopholes “which could easily be 
exploited by unscrupulous officials and members of the public.” Of the R11.5 
billion paid out to 2.8 million beneficiaries in 1995-1996, it was estimated that 
about ten percent was lost to fraud and corruption. As it reports, “fraud and 
corruption are rampant as a consequence of a lack of systems, proper internal 
controls, unduly complex legislation and department rules governing internal 
disciplinary proceedings.” This malfeasance is said to “represent the greatest 
threat to the programme” of welfare, requiring a “complete re-engineering” 
(1996: 23).  
 
While it mentioned the possibility that some tasks could be decentralized, this 
potential was not the subject of further detail; instead, the Committee focused on 
unifying and standardizing a national system in which, as a result, it was 
believed that the detection of fraud would be easier. The report also emphasized 
the need to establish “linkages with other systems… such as the Home Affairs, 
Population Registration System, other pension insurance funds, South African 
Police Services (SAPS), Deeds Registry, the provincial financial control 
systems, and post offices and banks” (1996: 6). Specific recommendations for 
the social security system were offered, including a nationally organized system, 
a national human resources strategy, a standardized and integrated management 
system, a “national transverse information system,” and regulatory 
simplifications. Thus, standardization was a task both within social security and 
between other government programs. 
 
This logic was directed particularly at the means of identifying grant recipients. 
The committee argued that the “benefits of a biometric system can only be 
reaped if there is a uniform system for the country as a whole” (1996: 44). They 
were deeply concerned that the Eastern Cape, Gauteng, Northern Province, 
KwaZulu Natal and Mpumalanga were in various stages of issuing biometric 
contracts, enrolling beneficiaries, and using different proprietary systems for 
delivery, perhaps permitting fraud: “Without a national fingerprint data-base 
[sic] this gives no assurance that the person is who they claim to be.” Thus, their 
opposition to biometrics was pragmatic, concerned with the difficulty of 
creating a functioning system, especially as the amalgamation of different 
systems could compound data errors. 
 
They were also deeply concerned with the costs, especially in light of early 
indicators of ineffectiveness and corruption. As early as 1993, biometrics were 
tested in the Cape Province, and of the 190,000 recipients enrolled only 1,040 
potential duplicates were identified. When 254 of these were further 
investigated, only 32 were actually duplicate entries; the rest were mistakenly 
7 
 
flagged. The problem was compounded by the fact that biometrics reportedly 
cost more than double alternative means. In the Western Cape, the biometric 
system was said to cost R1.9 million per month, compared to the R16,500 per 
month savings from identifying 32 duplicates. Throughout, there were emerging 
concerns about corruption in provincial tendering for biometric welfare systems; 
ultimately these concerns would result in a full investigation by the Office for 
Serious Economic Offenses (OSEO) and ensnarl the NP’s senior welfare 
official, Abe Williams. As the Chikane Committee concluded, “[we are] gravely 
concerned that the outsourcing of biometric identification is premature, costly 
and will not necessarily eliminate fraud.” 
 
In the years following the Chikane Committee, the depiction of the problem and 
solution solidified into a relatively consensual view that (a) a crisis existed and 
(b) standardization was the necessary response. The archive yields few 
dissenting voices, especially among the representatives of the elite. The 1997 
White Paper on Social Welfare declared that fragmentation led to “gross 
inefficiencies” and “loopholes… which could be exploited by officials and the 
public” (1996: 51). The “manual system” for accounting and “the lack of an 
integrated national ID system” were specifically cited as problems. “A uniform 
social grants system”, it reasoned, required “the rationalization of computer 
systems and the development of a National Social Grants Register and 
automated fingerprint technology” (1996: 54). It noted that a national re-
registration effort might be required to produce an accurate database.  
 
The sense of calamity was exacerbated by a prominent 1997 revelation from the 
Mail & Guardian newspaper that an estimated R1 billion was being lost to 
pension fraud from an annual budget of R14.3 billion (see Reddy and Sokomani, 
2008: 19). A major report in the following year from a government watchdog, 
the Public Service Commission (PSC), detailed the state of service delivery and 
proposed a variety of institutional and technical reforms. The PSC’s 
Investigation into the Delivery of Social Security Services argued, like its 
predecessors, that the troubles of the social security program were the result of a 
lack of standards in the data captured from applicants, the complexity of 
regulations, the “varying interpretations of eligibility,” and the methods of 
payment. It recommended the “development of a national policy to standardise” 
paperwork, bureaucratic procedures, and identity documents (PSC, 1998: ix). 
The PSC recommended computerizing identification forms and adopting a 
national model from Home Affairs. When the report received additional 
attention at a series of Parliamentary hearings in February and March 1998, 
many of the findings and arguments were affirmed. For example, members of 
the Executive Councils from Free State and the Eastern Cape complained of the 
identification troubles facing their provinces. In the Free State, it was alleged 
that citizens from Lesotho claimed South African pensions; in the Eastern Cape, 
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former Transkei and Ciskei citizens lacked the new ID books while others had 
both the new ID books and older identity documents that were still accepted, 
thus were able to benefit twice (Saloojee, 1998). 
 
The report also reasoned through the institutional structures most able to deliver 
social grants in a manner keeping with the various demands of the democratic 
era. A decentralized model where “each province develops its own social 
security service” was rejected due to limited accountability and the recognition 
that “all citizens of South Africa should be treated equally” (PSC, 1998: 12). 
Instead, they recommended a centralized standard-setting entity with provincial 
departments who would deliver the grants. The 2002 Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa (led by 
Viviene Taylor) provided an important boost to these recommendations by 
advocating for the establishment of the South African Social Security Agency—
an entity introduced in 2004. 
 
The goal of SASSA is to serve as “the sole agency that will ensure the efficient 
and effective management, administration, and payment of social assistance” 
(RSA, 2002). As Selwyn Jehoma (2003a), the head of grants for the Department 
of Social Development, told Parliament in February 2003, in addition to 
providing clear accountability, integrating social security within a national 
agency would permit “standardization and uniform business processes” which 
would “reduce costs of service delivery.” Further, “[p]ractices of double dipping 
into funds would also not be possible with an Agency as the institution would 
have a better grip on social services.” Social Development Minister Skewyiya 
reiterated this, saying that “financial leaks had necessitated the centralization of 
control and payment of grants, leading to the formation of a social security 
agency that would do the job” (Radebe, 2006). As Mr. Jehoma (2003b) told 
Parliament a few months later, this was necessary because “it was not possible 
to give all nine provinces a set of guidelines and expect them to interpret and 
implement them in the same way [so] a nationally guided process was needed.” 
While few in Parliament advocated otherwise, at least some civil society 
organizations were skeptical of the centralization: the Black Sash worried that 
SASSA would merely “replicate the existing dysfunctions of the system” and 
that “the new system overlooks the political, social and technological nuances in 
each province” (Robinson, 2005). Their protest, though, was ineffectual. 
 
SASSA, then, has been tasked with homogenizing the policy and 
implementation of grants. While the fragmentation was particularly troubling for 
the manner in which it facilitated illicit behavior, it was also at odds with the 
egalitarian ethos of the newly democratic nation. For instance, not only did 
quality of service differ wildly, fundamental definitions of, say, what counted as 
disability meant that applicants may qualify for a grant in one province, but not 
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if they move to another (Reddy and Sokomani, 2008). In the context of hard-
fought equality, the grants, then, became a means of aspiring to and establishing 
uniformity of citizenship (cf. Peebles, 2008; Ferguson, 2002).  
 
 
3. The Pursuit of Objectivity in the Face of 
Bedeviling Discretion 
 
In addition to bureaucratic structures, fragmented and discretionary practice has 
come under scrutiny in post-apartheid welfare. As Daston and Galison (2007: 
199) emphasize, ‘objective’ should not be understood as synonymous with 
‘truth,’ but rather as the inverse of subjective. Certain techniques, such as 
automation or quantification, offer means by which to remove subjectivity (see 
Porter, 1995). In post-apartheid welfare, techniques of objectivity have been 
directed at two forms of subjective practice that have continued to trouble the 
bureaucratic and policy elite: illicit access to grants and inappropriate or inept 
bureaucratic action.  
 
Historically, grant fraud has occurred in various ways, from a 2008 case where 
just three people absconded with R22 million (Zulu, 2008), to more everyday 
acts of dissimulation, such as “looking poor” to pass the means test (Plagerson, 
et al., 2012; see also Versfeld, 2012). In conversations with and public 
statements by SASSA officials, two practices are considered particularly 
widespread. First, there is concern about “phantom twins,” the practice of 
registering fictional children in order to receive extra grants (one town 
reportedly had more than 100 twins in 2010 [Piloso, 2010]). Secondly, there is a 
perception that deceased pensioners are not reported as dead, and relatives 
continue to collect money on their behalf. This form of fraud is often linked to 
the use of bank accounts, where money is traditionally deposited without 




The wayward behavior of middle- and low-level bureaucrats has also been 
particularly troubling, with the widespread belief that error and incompetence 
undermine the effectiveness and equality of service. For pro-poor civil society 
organizations, bureaucrats have historically been found to be an impediment to 
the goal of improving legitimate access to the grants. This was most evident 
during the early years of the Child Support Grant when organizations like the 
Children’s Institute and Black Sash (Guthrie et al., 2000) highlighted 
“worrying… reports that applicants are often dissuaded from persisting with 
applications because of the attitude of welfare officials.” They called for 
                                           
3
 Interview with informant #6, a current government official (November 2012). 
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“welfare officials… to be educated” to improve their delivery behavior. As 
Simon Kimani (2000) of the National Association of Democratic Lawyers told 
Parliament, “some welfare officials are arrogant, rude and abusive.” At the time, 
the process of applying for grants was described as “torturous” because there 
were “no uniform standards, assessment guidelines and procedures, and some 
officials themselves [did] not know of or understand the procedures” (Guthrie, 
2002). For some, outsourcing to private payment firms was particularly 
problematic due to the inability or unwillingness of private firms to provide 
quality services (see Overy & Zuma, 2004). As Francie Lund and colleagues 
(2009) noted, “administrative discretion appears to be subverting the aim of the 
broader social policy.” They flagged as particularly ineffective policies such as 
Batho Pele and laws like the Administrative Justice Act which requires that 
“organs of state may not act capriciously and arbitrarily”. 
 
The work environment has exacerbated these problems. Offices were poorly 
maintained. Electricity and other infrastructures were missing. Paperwork and 
documents have been particularly troubling, with necessary forms variously lost, 
in the wrong language, and open to forgery (Kimani, 2000). For post-apartheid 
welfare, the documentary-mediation of state and citizen has often been a source 
of discretion and error, undermining the aspirations to fixed objectivity pinned 
upon them (cf. Scott, 1998).
4
 During the 1990s, there was “no way of verifying 
the authenticity” of applicants’ documents (PSC, 1998), especially if they were 
issued by entities with which the welfare administration had little 
interoperability (most importantly Home Affairs). In 2001, a report from the 
Auditor-General (2001) found 225,471 computer-generated ID numbers. These 
were formally supposed to be used for recipients who only had the apartheid-era 
identity documents, but in practice were used by unscrupulous bureaucrats to 
create false recipients. Nearly a decade later, an audit of SASSA highlighted 
similar documentary problems, noting deficiencies “including information 
technology controls” and “poor-filing management” (Hlongwa, 2010).  
 
For beneficiaries, a lack of identity documents has been one of the primary 
barriers to accessing the grants. Budlender et al. (2008) detail how “officials 
were requiring documents and other evidence far beyond what the law dictated”. 
Early in the Child Support Grant this was recognized as a barrier, and lobbying 
removed some of the requirements for children (Lund, 2008:75) but it still took 
a lawsuit—only decided in 2008—to permit a broader array of documents, 
                                           
4
 Although it is not traditional to consider inanimate paperwork an influential mediator, a 
growing amount of scholarship has emphasized the vitality of mundane artifacts (e.g. Latour, 
1992; Bennett, 2010). As Matthew Hull (2012: 13) writes, “Just as discourse has long been 
recognized as a dense mediator between subjects and the world, we need to see graphic 
artifacts not as neutral purveyors of discourse, but as mediators that shape the significance of 
the linguistic signs inscribed on them.” 
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including sworn affidavits (Lund, 2008: 486). Yet a 2010 survey found that 
problems with documentation remained the most significant reason for not 
receiving legitimate grants (Leibbrandt et al., 2010).   
 
*** 
Since the 1990s, the social grants have been depicted as ‘in crisis’ due to the 
specter of these forms of bedeviling discretion. The illegal and diffuse nature of 
this behavior makes estimating the extent of the problem quite difficult, but 
numerous entities have tried (see Reddy and Sokomani, 2008). These figures 
filter through Parliamentary hearings and budget speeches, news reports and 
opinion pieces, and daily discussions in South African society. When the 
Democratic Alliance said in Parliament that the DSD was “crippled by 
managerial dysfunction” and facing “a management crisis” (Waters, 2013) or 
when the Inkatha Freedom Party labeled “all SASSA offices across the country 
as … breeding grounds for corruption” (Inkatha Freedom Party, 2013), their 
rhetoric was not particularly uncommon, nor was it merely opposition 
politicking. The leaders of DSD and SASSA are also quick to admit widespread 
fraud and corruption, with Minister Dlamini calling it “endemic” (SASSA, 
2012a). Despite the difficulties of accurately assessing the amount of fraud and 
corruption, the ambiguity is rarely noted. It is the perception of crisis that is 
productive – based on, but not congruent, with facts. Roitman (2011; see also 
Roitman, 2013) has called for an understanding of “the kinds of work the term 
crisis is or is not doing”. In this case, at least one result is the adoption of 
biometric identification, conceived as a way to deliver grants impartially and 
uniformly, lowering costs and boosting efficiency. As a standard and objective 
technology, biometrics are understood as the solution to crisis.  
 
 
4. South African Biometric Welfare 
 
The technopolitics of standardization and objectivity have driven the adoption of 
biometrics as a way to reduce human discretion and boost bureaucratic 
efficiency. As Breckenridge (2005b: 281) noted, biometrics remove bureaucracy 
“from the world of paper-based documents and—more importantly—from the 
domain of human agency”. This goal continues, and in a recent outline of work 
for 2012-2015, SASSA emphasizes that “The automation of systems for 
improved service delivery is non-negotiable… The constant use of manual 
systems not only limits the number of applications that can be processed in a 
day, but also contributes significantly to fraud and corruption in the grants 
administration system” (SASSA, 2013a).  
 
The 2012 contract and re-registration into a centralized biometric database is a 
high-water mark of the welfare administration adopting biometrics. In part, it 
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has been propelled by the weaknesses in national identification infrastructure. 
As Breckenridge (2008) documents, the Home Affairs National Identification 
System (HANIS) is a long-running fiasco that only began to issue identity cards 
in mid-2013 though it has its roots in the security concerns of the 1980s. In the 
1990s, the ANC began to view this proposed biometric population registry as a 
key enabler of welfare expansion. The Public Service Commission (1998) 
recommended it, though recognized that it may not be available for some years.  
 
During the debates around the proposed basic income grant, proponents 
recognized the need to build the delivery infrastructure, and imagined HANIS 
being a key component of that. The Taylor Committee (RSA, 2002) 
recommended a phased introduction of the basic income grant, emphasizing that 
“to avoid any duplication of payment, a reliable identification and verification 
system will have to be established.” In 2003, the Basic Income Grant Coalition 
proposed to Parliament that “This ‘smart card’ based identification system is 
expected to offer the most cost-effective platform for the future administration 
and delivery of social grants” (BIG Coalition, 2003). Yet HANIS has been 
repeatedly delayed and over-budget, often impeded by competing legacy 
systems that are not interoperable, despite considerable effort at setting 
standards for biometric algorithms and financial infrastructures.  As one scholar 
of the Department of Home Affairs wrote, “HANIS has been in the Home 
Affairs pipeline for a number of years and seems always to be just a year or two 
from implementation” (Hoag, 2010). 
 
As institutional centralization accelerated, welfare officials began to take steps 
to develop a uniform identification method for grant recipients. As early as 
2003, a senior DSD official told Parliament that the proposed SASSA “would 
not have nine different contractual arrangements across all the provinces” 
(Jehoma, 2003b). In 2007, shortly after its formation, SASSA tried to 
standardize payment and identification infrastructure through a tender whose 
intent was “to ensure that service providers appointed in the nine provinces 
provided a standardized payment service in line with the norms of service 
delivery approved by government” (SASSA, 2007). It was ultimately (and 
begrudgingly) cancelled because no such regularity was deemed possible from 
the bids received. As the adjudication committee wrote, the bids did not offer 
“standardized payment services,” appropriate norms and standards of security 
and integrity, nor were they cost-effective (Arendse, 2008). In the interim, 
SASSA used the inherited provincial systems, many of which were technically 
incompatible and ineffective (Breckenridge, 2005b). Furthermore, for technical 
and contractual reasons, SASSA has not had ownership of a unified biometric 
database for recipients.
5
 The system that resulted from the amalgamation of 
                                           
5
 Interview with informant #2, a current government official (September 2012). 
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provincial databases has been routinely criticized for being out of date, filled 
with inaccuracies, and open to fraud (e.g., FinMark, 2012). Where fingerprint 
verification did occur, it was not always reliable, such as the case in 1999 when 
one town was found to be home to 1,650 identical fingerprints (Saloojee, 1999).  
 
More recently, though, biometrics have been turned inward as an effort to 
remove the opportunity for bureaucratic misbehavior. As SASSA reported to 
Parliament in March 2010 when justifying their budget, “[s]taff were more 
strictly controlled through biometric access systems and clearer controls” that 
recorded employee activity to search for fraud and “ensure that these staff could 
not easily access sensitive programs where they could manipulate information or 
create “ghost beneficiaries” in the system” (Pakade, 2010). This is part of a 
broader effort to automate grant delivery, removing unskilled or corrupt 
bureaucrats. For example, the acting CEO of SASSA illustrated the biometric 
imaginary’s conception of objectivity in an early 2011 complaint that “The lack 
of automated business processes make activities extremely labour-intensive and 
error-prone” (Ensor, 2011). Later that year, the head of SASSA’s internal audit 
and fraud management unit highlighted automation as a means of overcoming 
“poor employee work ethic” (Sibanyoni, 2011). Moving to electronic systems 
also saves money, and the acting CEO of SASSA noted during a time of 
financial limitations that automation also helped lower personnel, their “second 
largest portion of the budget” (Pakade, 2010). Future plans aim to continue the 
automation of services and the biometric identification of bureaucrats (SASSA, 
2013b: 12). 
 
The continuing salience of these twin goals is clearly evident in the issuance of 
the new grant payment contract in early 2012 to Net1 CPS, a South African 
technology firm. The government’s request for bids from contractors called for 
“significantly improved services” with “sameness of Beneficiary experience.”
6
 
“The minimum acceptable requirement during bulk and on-going enrolment,” 
they said, “is that all ten finger prints of Beneficiaries must be captured. The 
Biometric Data capturing during enrolment will be used for matching and 
authenticating during payment process.” In addition to requiring this data from 
grant recipients, beneficiaries – such as children – would also be incorporated. 
The goal, it explained, was to ensure “that a Beneficiary is not enrolled more 
than once” (SASSA, 2011). 
 
The award in early 2012 of the R10 billion contract for the entire country to 
Net1 CPS prompted an acrimonious court challenge by a losing bidder, AllPay.
7
 
                                           
6
 All government document quotations are sic, including the peculiar capitalization.  
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As a subsidiary of ABSA bank, AllPay was the incumbent payment provider in 
the Western Cape, Free State, Gauteng and parts of the Eastern Cape, while 
Net1 CPS operated in the other provinces (except Mpumalanga, where a third 
firm—Epilweni—was used). AllPay alleged improprieties in the tendering, 
including a potentially last minute change in requirements. These allegations 
were quickly supported by subsequent media reports that suggested the 
influence of bribery (e.g. McKune, 2012). These assertions led to a brief 
investigation in South Africa, an ongoing one in America (where Net1 is listed 
on the stock exchange), and a series of lawsuits that came to the fore with a 
November 2013 decision by the Constitutional Court which found the tender 
invalid due to procedural improprieties (but did not set it aside, pending another 
hearing in February 2014).  
 
SASSA’s court filings in response to AllPay’s initial February 2012 complaint 
make clear the importance of standardization and biometric authentication to 
their new contract. Their opening filing includes an extended discussion of grant 
“abuse arising mainly from a lack of uniformity” and that it was “resolved 
that… a national approach be adopted in dealing with social grants in order to 
instill uniformity and standardization” (Ramokgopa, 2012: 8-9). The filing also 
bemoans the “fragmented payment system” inherited from the provinces, split 
between multiple, incompatible contractors. For example, the SASSA 
representative explained, “that the six different [payment] methodologies 
employed in the Eastern Cape Province has directly led to substantial fraud and 
other abuses” (Ramokgopa, 2012: 10). 
 
In contrast to SASSA’s response, AllPay’s complaint depicted a different vision 
for the contract. “AllPay’s focus,” they asserted, “is to facilitate access to 
financial services and products to beneficiaries of social grants, with particular 
focus on the rural and semi-urban communities” (Webb, 2012: 22). Given the 
extensive network of ABSA bank branches and ATMs, AllPay maintained that 
they could provide formal financial services where Net1 could not (as a non-
bank). An insistence on biometric identification for each payment (instead of 
just registration) would render ATMs useless because they do not have 
fingerprint scanners. SASSA, however, rejected the preeminence of ‘banking the 
unbanked,’ contending that AllPay “did not make provision for adequate 
biometric verification and standardization of services” and thus “fell short of 
requirements imposed by SASSA” (Ramokgopa, 2012: 11). 
 
Net1 CPS, in contrast, put biometric identification at the core of its offerings, 
and, as they gleefully revealed in their submissions to the court, their new 
offering has been able to combine their proprietary biometric payment 
technology with the standard national payment system (such as that used by 
bank cards and ATMs). Because the standard system would still not allow 
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fingerprint verification, Net1 CPS would “conduct proof of life verification 
telephonically, as an alternative to fingerprint technology” (Belamant, 2012: 14). 
This new form of voice biometric verification would be used in cases where 
recipients were receiving their grants into a bank account, requiring a brief 




This seems to have caught AllPay by surprise. Not completely without merit, 
they had believed that fingerprinting was the biometric method de rigueur. 
Indeed, in declaring the contract invalid in late 2013, the Constitutional Court 
affirmed that a last-minute shift to requiring monthly biometric verification 
(rather than only at registration) rendered “the process entirely uncompetitive” 
(Froneman, 2013: 49).  It was not the case that AllPay was opposed to biometric 
identification – indeed, they spent considerable time detailing their technical 
acumen – but only after seeing their opening salvo in favor of “banking the 
unbanked” stall. It was a difference in emphases arising from technical and 
institutional legacies; while both would conduct fingerprint enrolment to remove 
duplicate entries, Net1 stressed a supposedly objective and standardized way to 
identify and pay recipients each month. Net1 CPS stakes its work on universal 
biometrics; for AllPay, it has been secondary to—even sometimes at odds 
with—its banking and ATM system. 
  
Beyond the court filings, SASSA officials have validated the new system to the 
public. In response to an inquiry about grant fraud from Parliament, the CEO of 
SASSA called the new biometric scheme “the greatest risk reduction tool that 
SASSA had engaged in its history” (Peterson, 2012a). Emphasizing the appeal 
of removing bureaucratic weakness, she has specifically highlighted 
“automation of business processes” (Peterson, 2012a). The Social Development 
Minister Dlamini (2013) also emphasized that interoperability with other 
government databases (including Home Affairs’ population registry) was 
enhanced. Speaking in March 2013, as the re-registration process was finishing, 
she reported that nearly 19 million recipients had been registered into the new 
system and that she was “pleased to report that 44 thousand social grants were 
manually lapsed at the request of the beneficiaries. A further 66 thousand grants 
lapsed due to non-collection. We shall continue to root out fraud and corruption 
whenever and wherever it appears to ensure that social grants only go to eligible 
beneficiaries.” She noted a further benefit was the ability to detect nearly 400 
beneficiaries who were receiving their grants outside of South Africa (a 
revelation at least one Member of Parliament deemed “shocking”). A few 
months later, as the registration drive ended, SASSA reported over 150,000 
                                           
8
 This is particularly relevant given a partnership with Grindrod Bank to provide bank 
accounts to grant recipients. For a discussion of the resulting controversy, see Donovan 
(forthcoming).   
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grants were voluntarily canceled, leading to a claimed saving of R150 million 
per annum (SASSA, 2013b).  
 
Where this proclaimed success stands, however, is less clear following the 
Constitutional Court’s unanimous declaration that the contract between SASSA 
and Net1 CPS was “constitutionally invalid” (Froneman, 2013: 53). The Court 
found that SASSA had contravened its constitutional duties in two ways during 
the tender process. First, the last-minute shift to seemingly requiring biometric 
verification at each payment created vagueness and uncertainty that undermined 
procedural fairness. Secondly, SASSA did not ensure that Net1 CPS was, as 
constitutionally required, empowering previously disadvantaged people. And 
while it thus found the contract “fatally defective” (Froneman, 2013: 41), it 
recognized the importance of continued grant delivery; therefore, it postponed a 
remedy until further information was gathered for a hearing in February 2014.  
 
*** 
For SASSA, the task of distributing millions of rand per month has required a 
sociotechnical network that minimizes the capacity for intermediaries to serve as 
anything but passive infrastructures. In the words of the PSC (1998), the goal is 
that “policy and execution are not divorced.” In the language of actor-network 
theory, the goal is to minimize the “translation” (Callon, 1986) that occurs 
during “action at a distance” (Law, 1986). Biometric identification has been a 
crucial means of doing so, serving as what Rose (1999: 155) calls a “key fidelity 
technique.”  In many ways, the new grant payment and identification 
infrastructure instituted in 2012 is the result of nearly two decades of reform 
efforts. The Chikane Committee’s call for biometrics to be addressed in a 
unified, national manner has been accomplished. In Minister Dlamini’s (2012) 
words, “The improved biometric-based payment solution was long overdue and 
will go a long way towards minimising fraud and corruption so prevalent in the 
previous systems.” But if the literature on audit (e.g. Power, 1997) is an 
indicator, there will need to be a social solution to the lack of trust, for ones 
based on technique alone “fail to immunize the assemblages they govern from 
doubt” (Rose, 1999: 155). Indeed, already the biometric technology has been 
questioned and subject to fraud, such as a case where fraudsters were found to 
be in possession of three biometric registration machines (Jacobs, 2013). The 
rest of this paper considers these shortcomings more directly.  
 
 
5. The Myth of Perfection 
 
The bureaucratic elite and their peers in civil society, the news media, and 
elsewhere have presented biometrics as a material means of improving service 
delivery, uniformly identifying recipients, and removing undesirable activity. 
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Speaking of the new biometric grants program, Social Development Minister 
Dlamini (2012) unequivocally stated that it “will eliminate incidents of fraud 
and corruption in the social grants system” which she said resulted from the 
“manual system that SASSA has been using.” SASSA’s chief, Virginia Peterson 
(2012b), claimed “the new SASSA card… will make it virtually impossible for 
fraudsters to defraud the Agency.” This appeal of biometric identification rests 





This faith in biometrics builds on the presumption of universality – everyone has 
fingers – and algorithmic objectivity. This is considered especially so when 
compared to alternative means of authentication, such as PINs which are 
considered vulnerable to fraud because the number can be shared. In contrast to 
this view of imperviousness, Magnet (2011) argues that biometric technology is 
prone to failure, not as an aberration or exception, but rather that “biometric 
errors are endemic.” The experience in South Africa adds to this thesis, 
suggesting the faith in biometrics is at least partly mistaken, that they are unable 
to remove the unevenness for which they are adopted. The confusion arises from 
a simplistic, overly technocratic understanding of the real-world 
implementation. Focusing too closely on the technical means through which 
individuals are identified by the state, rather than understanding the larger 
complexities of such an unwieldy task, often misleads the biometric imaginary. 
In J.D. Peters (2001: 9) words, the “mistake [is] to think that … better wiring 
will eliminate the ghosts” in the machine. Even the otherwise thoughtful 
Chikane Committee fell prey to defining problems and solutions in terms of 
technological systems, arguing that the “principle cause … [of] serious and 
widespread” fraud and corruption was “the lack of proper systems of internal 
control” (CRSS, 1996). Such a view ignores the role that poverty, inequality, 
and limited opportunity have in generating fraud.
10
 Instead, it focuses 
particularly on reforming systems of surveillance and audit. Biometrics, here, 
become another technical solution to social problems (cf. Pritchett and 
Woolcock, 2004; Morozov, 2013). 
 
As Breckenridge (2005a; 2005b) relates, this dynamic has a lengthy pedigree in 
South Africa. It has continued today, even as problems emerged in the 2012-
2013 registration initiative. For example, the children who were required to be 
enrolled were often fearful of the red light emitting from the fingerprint scanner, 
                                           
9
 Influential supporters of biometric identification reflect similar sentiments, including The 
World Bank (Garcia and Moore, 2012: 7) and the Center for Global Development (Gelb and 
Clark, 2011; 2013).  
10
 Von Schnitzler (2013) makes a similar point with regard to behavioral change and prepaid 
metering in Britain and South Africa. 
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protesting and crying as they mistakenly thought they would be burned.
11
 Early 
results from the use of the voice recognition system, too, suggest technical 
difficulties, including poor recording environments during re-registration 
(Kweyama, 2013). This is a sort of “data friction” that, as Edwards (2010: 97) 
notes, “generates errors and noise.” It is also indicative of Burrell’s (2012) 
assessment that many digital technologies now proliferating in sub-Saharan 
Africa are poorly designed for the “invisible users” who are not considered in 
the process of invention. 
 
A more significant failure of the biometric technology is the portion of the 
population that has been unable to enroll. In September 2013, thousands of 
elderly and ill pensioners did not receive their grant because they had been 
unable to re-register and promised home visits by SASSA had not occurred 
(Black Sash, 2013). Biometrics have proven especially problematic for domestic 
laborers whose fingerprints are eroded from years of washing dishes. Additional 
worries exist for farm and mine laborers, many of whom have lost fingerprints 
or even whole fingers and hands. Because biometric identification is compulsory 
in the new system, these populations will require a procurator, an individual who 
will enroll and withdraw money on their behalf.
12
 Of the figures available, in 
October 2012, with only 15 percent of the recipients re-registered, 13,000 
procurators had been required (SASSA, 2012b). This creates a form of 
dependency that, at the very least, will introduce complicated negotiations and 
conflicts for the individuals. More fundamentally, it unsettles the stated goal of 
“sameness of Beneficiary experience” (SASSA, 2011). Importantly, this 
disjuncture between presumed (and marketed) universality and the diverse 
reality of bodily features occurs along class, age, and gender lines: while fingers 
typical of white collar labor are rarely problematic, for low-income populations 
doing manual labor, this is not the case (Magnet, 2011). 
 
For all their mimetic aspirations, neither biometric technologies nor the 
dominant ways in which they are conceived accurately reflect reality. This is 
what makes the case of the biometric imaginary particularly apt: an imaginary is 
not a fantasy—it is grounded in reality and is actually productive—but it may be 
decoupled from certain on-the-ground realities. Put otherwise, despite biometric 
universality and objectivity being mythical, the biometric imaginary is 
productive. The technology does, viewed en masse, by and large enable an 
enormous and impressive welfare program. But like other technopolitical 
efforts, biometric identification can also be a productive failure (Edwards and 
Hecht, 2010; Edwards, 1996: 75-112). The promises embedded in the 
technology – such as ending corruption – need not be fully realized in order to 
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 Interview with informant #6, a current member of government (November 2012).  
12
 Interview with informant #2, a current member of government (September 2012).  
19 
 
justify the expense and effort of biometrics. This interpretive flexibility enables 
a wider range of support for biometric identification, fueling the biometric 
imaginary. Because biometric technology is presumed to be effective it can 
serve certain needs.  
 
This was clear when Minister Dlamini (2013) was “pleased to report” in March 
2013 that the biometric re-registration process had resulted in 44 thousand 
grants being cancelled and 66 thousand lapsing due to non-collection. This was 
represented – both in her speech and the subsequent media reports – as a 
successful example of using biometric identification to, as she put it, “root out 
fraud and corruption whenever and wherever it appears to ensure that social 
grants only go to eligible beneficiaries.” As a portion of beneficiaries (less than 
half a percent) this is quite small, but that does not seem to register, and the 
same dynamic occurred months later when the final number of voluntary 
cancelations was increased to more than 150,000. 
 
An important fact is that welfare surveillance and auditing in the form of 
biometric identification did not need to prove technically efficacious in order to 
produce its effects here. These individuals were not caught, but rather 
preemptively canceled or let lapse their grants. Even if all the lapsed grants were 
fraudulent (an heroic assumption given widespread beneficiary confusion and 
frequent normal turnover), it was not the promised de-duplication or identity 
verification that was responsible. It was the perception that the technology 
functions which produced its result. The authoritative presentation of biometric 
technology as effective is performative (cf. Austin, 1975); rupture-talk helps to 
create the desired disjuncture (Hecht, 2002).
13
 A bit more speculatively, one can 
imagine that the presentation of such anti-corruption efforts – especially ones 
utilizing innovative and not particularly well-understood technology – performs 
a different reality to another audience: it demonstrates a particular seriousness 
about the ‘crisis’ in grant fraud and corruption on the part of DSD and SASSA 
to a population and political elite deeply concerned with cost overruns and illicit 
grant access.   
 
Finally, it is important to note another way in which biometrics ‘work’ even if 
they do not meet their promise of ending fraudulent access. In receiving the 
SASSA contract, Net1 CPS secured a large and lucrative market of around R2bn 
annually. Had they lost the contract, 50 percent of their business would have 
reportedly followed (Speckman, 2012). Instead, they have revealed that they are 
currently in talks with 11 other countries, no doubt benefiting from the prestige 
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 On this phenomenon in surveillance see Bogard (1996) and Gates (2011). Joseph Masco 
(2002: 460) has noted a similar result in his ethnography of nuclear scientists operating in a 
context of “hypersecurity” – as with the nuclear bomb, technologies like lie detectors work 
because they are perceived to work.  
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and experience of this contract. Serving as payment provider for so many has 
also opened up ancillary markets, such as (controversially) offering financial 
services (McKune, 2012). For those who place credence in the corruption 
allegations (which they deny), the importance of this contract to the firm is taken 
as motive, but a more general point is also true: the fervent commitment to 
combating the ‘crisis’ with biometric identification – and not, say, identity 
documents – has boosted a nascent technology without many other markets. 
 
 
6. The Political Ambiguities of Delegation 
 
In addition to its means, the end results of this process are also worthy of 
questioning. The effort to end improper discretion and uneven service delivery 
has resulted in a situation where responsibility has increasingly been delegated 
away from humans and toward machines.
14
 This has primarily been twofold: (a) 
away from little scrutinized and poorly verified grant applications and toward 
interoperable databases in order to remove those deemed undeserving and (b) 
away from street-level bureaucrats and toward biometric cash dispensers. This 
transformation is widely considered legitimate, but in neither case is it an 
unalloyed good. Instead, as von Schnitzler (2013) has discussed with regard to 
prepaid metering in South Africa, these infrastructures implement particular 
ethical and political regimes.  
 
The emphasis on technologies of surveillance and audit serves to constrict what 
Scott (1992) calls “infrapolitics,” the everyday weapons of the weak.
15
 Many 
poor South Africans share details on how to pass the means test and qualify for a 
grant (Plagerson et al., 2012; Versfeld, 2012). According to the Special 
Investigation Unit, one of the primary forms of grant “fraud” is “individuals 
who initially qualified to receive a grant but then saw an improvement in their 
financial status which generally disqualifies them from receiving grants” (Timm, 
2012). Yet, the simplistic, binary means test does not accord with the fluid, 
fluctuating incomes of the poor (Collins et al., 2010). In a situation of rampant 
and durable unemployment, much of it caused by racial authoritarianism, there 
is a case to be made that numerous practices deemed ‘grant fraud’ are actually 
infrapolitical tactics and necessary livelihood strategies.
16
 Instead of recognizing 
this, there are emerging suggestions of increasing the surveillance of grant 
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 On delegation, see Ribes et al. (2013); Akrich and Latour (1992).  
15
 See also Chatterjee (2004) on the (anti-)politics of administration. 
16
 Moreover, it seems odd that fraud and corruption should be so closely linked when, in 
reality, they are different activities, often operating in different moral registers: a poor 
individual acting even poorer to get some assistance does not seem the same as a salaried 
government employee falsifying invoices, yet ‘fraud and corruption’ are so tightly linked 
discursively that the distinction is rarely made. 
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usage, perhaps through digital transaction monitoring or payment systems that 
block certain purchases such as alcohol (Monama, 2013).  
 
As detailed above, the new grant system has sought to replace street-level 
bureaucrats with machines, as well as to increase recipient convenience by 
allowing payments at ATMs and third-party merchants (equipped with biometric 
readers). While 60 percent of beneficiaries used to receive their grant at SASSA 
pay points, as of April 2013, it had decreased to 22 percent, with a significant 
shift toward ATMs and retailers (Dunkerley, 2013). Subsequently, ATM 
providers have reported “a huge injection” of new users in the form of SASSA 
beneficiaries (Moyo, 2013). In contrast to the traditional SASSA pay points, 
where a government employee was present, in the new system, beneficiaries 
now interact with a third-party merchant or faceless machine.  
 
The irony is that the distance between citizen and state has been extended in an 
effort to remove discretionary middle-men between the fiscus and the pockets of 
the poor. In Ferguson’s (2013: 236) felicitous phrase, the result is perhaps 
“asocial assistance” rather than “socially ‘thick’ recognition…between state and 
citizen.” In these ways, biometric welfare resembles what Callon et al. (2009) 
call ‘delegative democracy’, the assignment of technopolitics to specialists, not 
the broader public. When something fails – as it did during a technical error in 
January 2013 where many pensioners in the Western Cape did not receive their 
full grant – the delegation means those on the ground are unable to address the 
errors (Matlata, 2013).
17
 The shift to objective technology is not neutral and the 
removal of subjective discretion is biased toward those who control the 
technology. 
 
These delegations and redistributions of power, in turn, raise the stakes 
elsewhere. The countless street-level negotiations, maneuvers, and deceptions 
that the biometric imaginary condemns as illicit fraud (rather than ambiguous 
infrapolitics) are minimized while the influence of the central policy and 
standards are enhanced.
18
 When the rise of biometric welfare administration is 
viewed as redistribution of subjectivity – rather than (as the biometric imaginary 
has it) an absolute reduction – then it is less surprising why the current biometric 
contract between SASSA and Net1 CPS has been the subject of intense legal 
dispute and allegations of corruption. If true, it suggests that the effect of the 
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 Interview with informant #4, a member of civil society focused on human rights (March 
2013). 
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 This can be compared to other social sectors, such as healthcare. Vale (2012a; 2012b) has 
documented the improvisations necessary for community health workers to fulfill their duties, 
a street-level informality that is in conflict with official rules. A similar conflict is currently 




biometric system has been to reduce petty corruption but increase grand 
corruption. Although SASSA and Net1 strenuously deny the allegations (and 
have gone forward with the contract) the episode is an illuminating suggestion 
that the reduction of subjectivity at the street-level increases the subjectivity at 
the center. The centralization also created a certain fragility, illustrated during 
the court battles when two courts found the contract invalid but (as of December 
2013) refused to set it aside due to the disruption it would cause to the millions 
of grant beneficiaries. 
 
Indeed, the centralization of welfare decision-making in post-apartheid South 
Africa has created a situation of concentrated judgment about who qualifies for 
grants and who does not, both in policy and technical enactment. The opposition 
to street-level subjectivity magnifies the influence of decisions made by SASSA. 
Given the pathetic state of social assistance delivery at the end of apartheid, it 
seems clear that some centralized uniformity was necessary (Geviser, 2007: 
716) but numerous observers have argued that the South African state is too 
centralized and technocratic (see Marais, 2003; Hemson and O’Donovan, 2006; 
Terreblanche, 2008; Friedman, 2009; Barchiesi, 2011; Marais, 2011).  
 
The biometric imaginary may be understood similarly, but as I have argued, it is 
also the result of political liberalization, an opening up that means no longer is 
poor administrative capacity free from the agitations and demands of the public. 
The technopolitical regime that reached its height with SASSA’s 2012 biometric 
payment contract is closely tied to the founding principles upon which most 
agree: post-apartheid social policy should be equitably and competently 
administered, in a manner that is impersonal and objective, free from the 





“…standards are a means by which we construct objective reality…”  
 — Busch (2011: 68)  
 
The social grants are one of the flagship interventions of the new South Africa. 
At around 3.5 percent of GDP and benefiting around 40 percent of the 
population, they are intimately involved in the formation of South Africa’s 
democratic identity, even if, in many ways, they are the product of the old South 
Africa. This importance and their scale make the social grants the subject of 
politically divisive debates, ranging from their affordability to their impact. 
Throughout these contests, though, runs a firm commitment to delivering grants 
reliably and equitably. The quality of implementation, therefore, is central to the 
broader politics of grants. This realm of implementation is one of civil servants 
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and paperwork, fingerprint ridges and accounting techniques. It is a complex 
interchange between the state and citizen that occurs millions of times each 
month. And it is a relationship to which biometric identification technology is 
pivotal. 
 
On one level, this paper has been an exploration of the salience of biometric 
technology within the social grants program. What explains the investment in 
identification infrastructure by the welfare bureaucracies? Why this method and 
not others? A colloquial answer would point to fraud and corruption, and while 
the widespread belief that the grants are the subject of exploitation and 
administrative incompetence has been a key motivating factor, this does not 
exhaust the particular reasons and manners through which it has unfolded. 
Instead, my argument traces a shared commitment – the biometric imaginary – 
that has grown during nearly twenty years of welfare implementation. The 
biometric imaginary positions biometric technology as a necessary, suitable, and 
effective means of achieving standardized and objective welfare administration. 
It is broader than just the purchase and use of fingerprint scanners; it builds upon 
programs of institutional reform, policymaking debates, and infrastructural 
development, but the implementation of a nationally centralized biometric 
identification scheme is perhaps its apogee, a technopolitical goal that has come 
together during the post-apartheid era as various forms of delivery weakness and 
fraud have bedeviled the initiative.  
 
As I have traced, the institution of a national biometric grant identification 
scheme in 2012 has a long lineage. Most directly it is the result of SASSA’s 
failed 2007 tender that was cancelled when no standardized option was deemed 
feasible. But the goal of a standardized and objective delivery mechanism is the 
result of a longer history, extending to at least the democratic transition where 
the inheritance of a fragmented bureaucracy curtailed the ability of the state to 
use its redistributive function to alleviate poverty. Since the mid-1990s, this 
fragmentation has been blamed for weak service delivery and widespread fraud 
and corruption. Unification through a process of centralized standards setting 
has been the order of the day, necessitating institutional reorganization, 
regulatory alignment, and infrastructural interoperability. That the biometric 
database has been explicitly designed as a nationally centralized system is not an 
accident, but rather the result of nearly two decades of broader reform and 
commitment. One could readily imagine alternative models – such as the 
provincial biometric schemes adopted during the 1990s – but the lack of 
interoperability with other provinces and the attendant sub-national differences 





One could also imagine alternative methods of identification, such as the paper 
identity books or PIN-based authentication. And at various times, these and 
other alternatives have been proposed – after all, imaginaries are neither 
totalizing nor uniformly applicable – but the promise of a unique and universally 
valid identifier that would operate free from human temptation has attracted the 
bureaucratic and policy elite. For the government, biometric identification 
represents an automated – and thus impersonal – means of identification, a way 
to end illicit behavior while paying grants uniformly. As Daston and Galison 
(1992) note, “Instead of freedom of will, machines offer… freedom from will.” 
 
As I have argued, these commitments to standardization and objectivity are 
deeply held, influencing welfare policy and practice beyond just biometric 
identification. As the new biometric grant system unfolds, they will undoubtedly 
continue to influence its trajectory, though unlikely in uniformly effective or 
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